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THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S "FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS":
PATROLLING THE PORTALS TO TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS
BROUGHT UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Although section 4 of the Clayton Act' provides that any person injured
in his business or property by reason of an antitrust violation can recover
treble damages from the antitrust violator, the federal courts have been
unwilling to construe section 4 literally. The circuit courts of appeals have
limited this broadly worded statute by creating various tests for "antitrust
.standing." 2 The Supreme Court, although never directly approving standing
requirements unique to antitrust, has placed two important limitations on the
scope of section 4. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 3 the Court
held that only plaintiffs who could prove "antitrust injury.... injury of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent" could collect damages under
section 4. 4 In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 5 the Court held that a plaintiff who
purchases a product only indirectly from an antitrust violator, i.e. through a
middleman, is not permitted to prove that he was injured when the middle-
man "passed on" the violator's illegal overcharge." Although neither
Brunswick nor Illinois Brick were decided on the grounds of antitrust standing,
both decisions are relevant to the efforts of the lower federal courts to create
a law of standing which will determine the appropriate set of plaintiffs enti-
tled to bring a treble damage action under section 4.
In Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group,' the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit attempted to balance traditional antitrust standing con-
cerns, the Supreme Court's definition of "antitrust injury" in Brunswick, and
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Illinois Brick. 8 The individual civil actions
' 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). The section provides in full:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or
is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy.
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
See, e.g., Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975); In re
Multidistrict. Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045
(1973); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). For a summary of the
antitrust standing tests used in the circuits, see Note, Standing to Sue in Private Antitrust
Litigation: Circuits in Conflict, 10 IND. L. REv. 532 (1977). It has been suggested that the
term "antitrust standing" is a misnomer. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 447
n.6 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) ("EtThe policy of limiting liability
implicit in § 4 which has evolved under the rubric of "standing," however, is a concept
of proximate causation distinct from the concept of personal stake necessary to estab-
lish article III jurisdiction. Our discussion here deals only with the former concept
which has been misnamed "standing.").
3 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
4 Id. at 489.
431 U.S. 720 (1977).
6 Id. at 735, 745-46.
7 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
8 Id. at 582.
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consolidated in Mid-West arose out of a 1976 criminal indictment charging
five paper hag manufacturers with conspiring to fix the prices of consumer
bags in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act." One of the plaintiffs,
Murray's of Baederwood, was a delicatessan that alleged that it had purchased
consumer bags from a manufacturer in competition with the defendants."
The price fixing conspiracy was so effective, Murray's contended, that it
raised the market price of consumer bags throughout the industry)! Mur-
ray's brought a section 4 action alleging injury caused by the defendants' con-
spiracy and claiming as damages the difference between the competitive mar-
ket price of consumer bags and the artificially inflated price charged by his
supplier as a result of the "umbrella" of high prices created by the defen-
dants." Murray's, however, did not allege that his supplier was part of the
conspiracy. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennyslvania
granted summary judgment against all the plaintiffs under the authority of
Illinois Brick.' 3
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirming
the district court's decision as to Murray's,' 4
 indicated that no single test of
antitrust standing is controlling in the Third Circuit." The court indicated
that traditional antitrust standing tests, the requirement of "antitrust injury"
and the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick would all be considered in
9
 Id. at 575. Consumer bags are single or multilayered bags used to prepack-
age products such as coffee, pet foods, chemicals and ice cream. Id.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall
be punished by fine not exceeding One million dollars if a corporation, or,
if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment
not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court.
'" 596 F.2d at 580. There were two additional categories of plaintiffs iden-
tified by the Third Circuit. Court of Appeals. The first was a group of retail stores
which had purchased the defendants' bags indirectly through middlemen. The court
affirmed the dismissal of their actions because of the holding in Illinois Brick. Id. Mur-
ray's was also a member of this category of indirect purchasers.
In the second additional category of plaintiffs was Mid-West Paper Products Co.,
a middleman, which purchased bags directly from a subsidiary of a defendant. Its
action was remanded to determine more fully the relationship between the defendant
and its subsidiary. Id. at 589. All plaintiffs sought both monetary damages under sec-
tion 4 and injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
The Third Circuit allowed all the plaintiffs to maintain their actions for injunctive
relief, reasoning that because of the different language of section 16, the fact that
Illinois. Brick was particularly concerned with treble damages, and the need for flexibil-
ity in equitable relief, the standing requirement for section 16 is less rigorous than for
section 4. 596 F.2d at 589-94.
" Id. at 580.
12 Id. at 580-81.
13 Id. at 576. The order was not accompanied by an opinion. Id.
14 Id. at 587.
15
 Id. at 582.
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making a "functional analysis of the factual context presented in each case" to
determine whether a plaintiff has standing to sue under section 4. 16 The
Mid-West court held that a plaintiff who purchases a product from the com-
petitor of price fixing firms, and who maintains that this competitor raised his
prices in response to the artificially high market price created by the conspir-
acy, does not have standing to sue the conspirators under section 4." Judge
Higginbotham, dissenting, would have granted Murray's standing to sue."
The Third Circuit's "functional analysis" approach to antitrust standing,
although a potentially sound method of analysis, was not effectively employed
in Mid-West. This Note will briefly consider the antitrust standing tests which
have been developed in the circuits, and will discuss the Supreme Court's
decisions in Brunswick and Illinois Brick. The majority and dissenting opinions
in Mid-West will then be examined. It will be demonstrated that the Mid-West
court failed to identify and distinguish the different policy considerations
which underlie traditional antitrust standing tests, the Supreme Court's defini-
tion of "antitrust injury" and the Supreme Court's holding in Illinois Brick. An
examination of these considerations reveals that the direct purchaser from a
competitor of price fixing conspirators should be granted standing to sue
under Section 4.
I. LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON SECTION 4:
POLICIES AND PRECEDENT
A. Traditional Tests of Antitrust Standing: A "Decisional Morass"
The federal district courts and circuit courts of appeals have been unwill-
ing to grant standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act to literally "any
person" alleging injury resulting from an antitrust violation." These courts
fear that a literal interpretation of section 4 would impose ruinous liability on
antitrust defendants and thus conflict with Congress's goal in passing the an-
titrust laws—to preserve and encourage free competition. 2° If no restrictions
1 " Id.
17 Id. at 587.
18 Id. at 595.
19 Sec note 2 supra and In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122,
25 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). Judge Ely observed:
Read literally, this statute could afford relief to all persons whose injuries
are causally related to an antitrust violation. Recognizing the nearly limit-
less possibilities of such an interpretation, however, the judiciary quickly
brushed aside this construction. Id.
But see Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292, 1302 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). Judge Levit, dissenting,
stated If lines of demarcation, limitations or restrictions are to be drawn and imposed
on the statute, that is for the legislative branch to do and not for this court." Id.
2 ° See Croniar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506 (3d
Cir. 1976); Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454
F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,.406 U.S. 930 (1972). The primary goal of
the antitrust laws was stressed during the deliberations on the Hart-Scott-Rodino An-
titrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-1505 (1976)). "The antitrust laws clearly reflect the national policy of en-
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were placed on the statute, one court concluded, the "flood-gates" would open
and suits would be brought by "every creditor, stockholder, employee, subcon-
tractor, or supplier of goods and services" who might in some way be affected
by an antitrust violation." The result of allowing treble damages to all such
plaintiffs would be "an over-kill, due to the enlargement of the private
weapon to a caliber far exceeding that contemplated by Congress."'
The circuit courts have been reluctant to allow recovery to plaintiffs who
have not suffered "direct" injuries, but whose injuries are merely derived
from those sustained by the initial victims of an antitrust violation. 23 In Ames
v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.," for example, the plaintiff owned
stock in an independent telephone company which was driven into receiver-
ship by the defendant." As a result, the plaintiff's stock became worthless.
The court held that a shareholder has no independent cause of action apart
from a suit by the corporation itself." The court reasoned that to allow the
plaintiff to sue independently would "subject the defendant not merely to
treble damages, but to sextuple damages, for the same unlawful act.""
Whereas a shareholder's injury simply duplicates the injury suffered by
the corporation, some individuals suffer derivative injuries that are distinct
from and additional to the injury suffered by the primary antitrust victim. In
Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 28 for example, the plaintiff leased a movie
theatre and received a fixed percentage of his lessee's profits as rent." Due
to an illegal conspiracy, the lessee's profits were reduced and, consequently,
the rent received by the plaintiff was also reduced. 3 ° Therefore, both the
plaintiff and his lessee suffered distinct injuries. The district court neverthe-
less held that the plaintiff's loss was beyond the limit of injuries redressable
under section 4. 3 '
Because of these related concerns of ruinous liablity and recoveries based
on derivative injuries, the federal courts have created two primary tests for
determining antitrust standing—the direct injury test and the target area
couraging private panics (whether consumers, businesses, or possible competitors) to
help enforce the antitrust laws in order to protect competition through compensation
of antitrust victims, through punishment of antitrust violators, and through deterrence
of antitrust violations." H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. Con• Cone. & AD. NEWS 2589.
" Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454
F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
22 Id.
23 See, e.g., Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bonlbadier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1979), aff'd on rehearing, 615 F.2cl 575 (1980): Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d
1129 (5th Cir. 1975); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 481 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
24
 166 F. 820 (1st Cir. 1909).
25
 Id. at 823.
20 Id.
22
 Id.
28
 115 F. Stipp. 312 (EA). Pa. 1953). of 'd per curian 1, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied. 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
2" Id. at 316.
311
81
 Id. at 317.
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test—which limit the scope of section 4 protection." These tests do not ad-
dress the traditional concerns of constitutional standing to sue because the
antitrust plaintiff usually will have alleged sufficient injury in fact. Rather, the
tests concentrate on the came of the plaintiff's harm, the section 4 require-
ment that the plaintiff's injury be "by reason of" an antitrust violation." If
the causality is attenuated, as when the plaintiff has suffered only indirect
injuries, standing is often denied. 34
Federal courts which apply the direct injury test focus primarily on the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and deny standing if a
third person is interposed between these parties." The test was first enun-
ciated in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Go. 3 " where the plaintiff, a stockholder and a
creditor of a corporation, brought a private treble damage action alleging that
the defendant had driven the corporation out of business." The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit denied the plaintiff standing to sue becaue he
had not suffered any "direct injury."" The court stated that the antitrust
violation was directed at the corporation, not at the individual stockholder or
creditor, and hence the plaintiff's injuries were only "indirect, remote, and
consequential." 3" The direct injury test has also been used to deny standing
to suppliers, 4" landlords ." and franchisors 42 when it was the customer, tenant
or franchisee who was injured initially by the antitrust violation: Competitors
of the antitrust defendant or those in privity with the defendant, however, are
usually held to satisfy the direct injury test because of their immediate rela-
tionship to the defendant.'"
The target area test, which is now more widely used than the direct injury
test," does not concentrate on the relationship between plaintiff and &fen-
32 For a more detailed discussion of these two tests and the policies which
underlie them, see Berger and Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing,
86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Berger and Bernstein].
33 Some courts view the test for antitrust standing as simply a test of proxi-
mate causation. See, e.g., Bogus v. American Speech and Hearing Assoc., 582 F.2c1 277,
284 (3d Cir. 1978); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358. 363 (9th Cir.
1955).
" See text at notes 23-31 supra.
33 In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2c1 122, 127 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). See Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malarnud, 51
N.Y.U. L. Rey. 374, 380 (1976).
3"
 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
37 Id. at 707. The case was brought under section 7 of the Sherman Act, 26
Stat. 210 (1890), the predecessor of section 4 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1976), passed in 1914. 183 F. at 705.
38 Id. at 709.
3" Id,
4" Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 395 (6th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963).
41 Asbestos Co. v. johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Stipp. 389, 390-91 (S.I).N.Y.
1939), affil per curiae, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940),
42 Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. Ass'n of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382
F.2d 925, 927-29 (10th Cir. 1967).
43 See P. AREFIDA AND 1), e l'URNER, ANTITRUST LAW at 164-65 (1978).
44 For a summary of the antitrust standing tests used in the circuits, see Note,
Standing to Sue in Private Antitrust Litigation: Circuits in Conflict, 10 IND. L. Rev. 532
(1977).
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dant, but on the region of the economy affected by the defendant's illegal
acts. To attain standing under this test a plaintiff must allege both injury
caused by the illegal activity and that he is within the target area of the viola-
tion, defined as "that area of the economy which is endangered• by a break-
down of competitive conditions in a particular industry."'" Courts which
apply the target area test emphasize that the test does not foreclose meritori-
ous claims "simply because another antitrust victim interfaces the relationship
between the claimant and the alleged violator," 4F and that therefore the test is
more responsive to congressional intent than is the direct injury test. 47 Thus
under the target area test some plaintiffs who have suffered derivative in-
juries arc granted standing to sue despite the indirectness of their injuries."
Courts which apply the target area test have not always agreed on the
scope of the target area. The most restrictive application of the test requires
the defendant to have actually "aimed" his illegal activity at the plaintiff. Iii
Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.," for example,
the plaintiff was a non-operating landlord of movie theatres who alleged that
his share of his tenants' profits was reduced by the anticompetitive activities of
the defendant film distributors. 5° The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit held that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue under section 4 because he
was outside the target area of the violation; "the alleged conspiracy was admit-
tedly not aimed at plaintiff', but at competing distributors and exhibitors.""
In comparison, the least restrictive application of the target area test re-
quires only that the plaintiff's harm have been foreseeable by the defendant.
A district court in Stale of Washington v. American Pipe and Construction Co. 52
used this form of the test to decide whether a plaintiff who has purchased
goods only from a competitor of price fixing conspirators has standing to sue
those conspirators under section 4. One group of plaintiffs in American Pipe
had purchased conduit pipe from non-conspiring competitors of the price-
fixing defendants." They alleged that their suppliers raised prices because
of the conspiracy. Requiring that the plaintiffs' harm have been foreseeable,
the court held that these plaintiffs were within the target area of the violation
and thus had standing to sue. 54 The court reasoned that because the con-
spirators sought to raise prices by ending competitive bidding, they should be
liable for damages sustained on all sales affected by the lack of competition."
45 Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
46 in re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 127 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
47 Id. at 128. See also Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th
Cir. 1975); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955); In
re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072, 1 104 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
1 " See, e.g., Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1967).
49 454 F.2d 1292, 1302 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
56 Id. at 1294.
'' Id. at 1296. •
52
 280 F. Supp. 802 (W.D, Wash. 1968).
33 Id. at. 805.
54
 Id. at 807.
55 Id.
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It has been suggested that the law of antitrust standing is a "decisional
morass" which leads to inconsistent results. 55 One of the primary reasons for
the fragmentation and confusion which exists in this area of the law is that
the Supreme Court has neither adopted a test for antitrust standing nor made
consistent statements about the proper construction of section 4 of the
Clayton Act. On different occasions, the Court has stated that the antitrust
laws must he vigorously enforced through section 4 actions, 57 that no addi-
tional requirements should be imposed on antitrust plaintiffs "beyond what is
specifically set forth by Congress in the [antitrust] laws," 58 and that it looks to
the "plain language" of section 4. 5 " These statements suggest that no special
standing requirements for section 4 actions should exist at all. In Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co. of California," however, the Supreme Court indirectly ap-
proved of the lower courts' use of antitrust standing tests.
In Hawaii the Court refused to permit the state of Hawaii to recover as
parens patriae for the overcharges paid by its citizens due to a price-fixing
conspiracy."' The Court was concerned with the risk of duplicative re-
coveries if both the state and its citizens could recover for the same injury. 52
In support of its holding the Court cited antitrust standing decisions in the
First through Tenth Circuits, and stated that the lower courts "have been
virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress did not intend the antitrust
laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be
traced to an antitrust violation."" This statement has been cited by the lower
federal courts for the proposition that the Supreme Court, at least implicitly,
approves the antitrust standing requirements which limit the scope of section
4." 4
Berger and Bernstein, supra note 32, at 840. See also Handler, The Shift
from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual An-
titrust Review, 71 Co'im. L. REV. 1, 24; Note, Illinois Brick, The Death Knell tf Ultimate
Consumer Antitrust Suits, 52 Sr. JoHN's L. REV. 421, 425 (1978).
57 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977).
58 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). The Court was
referring to private antitrust litigants in the context of section 5 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 16 (1976).
" Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2326, 2334 (1979). The issue raised in
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. was standing to sue under section 4, but the precise question
was different from that in Mid-West. The issue addressed by the Court was whether a
consumer who has been injured by an antitrust violation has been injured in his "busi-
ness or property" as required by section 4. The Court rejected the argument that only
commercial interests were protected by section 4 and held that consumers have stand-
ing to sue under the section. The Court noted, however, that it was not addressing the
question of whether a consumer might lack standing because of the "indirect pur-
chaser" rule of Illinois Brick. Id. at 2330 n.3. See text at notes 87-103, infra.
" 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
"I Id. at 252-53.
" Id. at 267 n.14.
63 Id.
" See, e.g ., In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1168 (5th
Cir. 1979); Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 505
(3d Cir. 1976); Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir.
1976); Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975).
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In the absence of more specific guidance by the Supreme Court, the
district and circuit court of appeals will undoubtedly continue to go their
separate ways in refining the existing standing tests. Even when the labels
"direct injury test" or "target area test" are used, antitrust contestants remain
unenlightened due to the many variations and inconsistent applications of
each test. Indeed, as many as seven different approaches to antitrust standing
have been identified as currently in use in the circuits." 5 These varying ap-
proaches are all related, however, in that they stem from the same assumption
that section 4 cannot be construed literally. As mentioned above, this assump-
tion is founded on the fear of ruinous liability and the unwillingness to allow
treble damages for plaintiffs with certain indirect injuries." Thus the issue
which the lower federal courts have confronted in continuing to develop an-
titrust standing law is not whether section 4 should be read literally, but how
the literal scope of the statute should be reduced.
B. Limitations on Section 4 Imposed by the Supreme Court
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of antitrust
standing directly, and has given contradictory signals regarding the appro-
priate construction of section 4, it has narrowed the literal scope of section 4
by requiring that a plaintiff prove "antitrust injury" and by barring the offen-
65 Compare Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955),
with Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola, Co. 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 923 (1971). Compare also Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th
Cit.. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971), with Calderone Enterprises Corp. v.
United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.'
930 (1972). The following approaches have been used by one or more circuits: 1) The
"direct injury" approach. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
Plaintiff was denied standing because he "did not receive any direct injury from the
alleged illegal acts of the defendant." Id. at 709. 2) The "target area" approach. Con-
ference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951). cert. denied, 342
U.S. 919 (1952). A plaintiff "must show that he is within that area of the economy
which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular indus-
try." Id. at 54-55. 3) The "Karseal target area" approach. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil
Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955). "Turning now to the cases concerning the 'target
area' ... the rule is that one who is only incidentally injured by a violation of the
antitrust laws,—the bystander who was hit but not aimed at,—cannot recover against
the violator." Id. at 363. 4) The "proximate target area" approach. South Carolina
Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2c1 414 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 385
U.S. 934 (1966). "If a plaintiff can show himself within the sector of the economy in
which the violation threatened a breakdown of competitive conditions and that he has
proximately injured thereby, then he was standing to sue under section 4." Id. at 41. 8.
5) The "forseeable target area" approach. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v.
Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964). To recover under
section 4 "the plaintiff must show that plaintiff's affected operation was actually in
the area which it could reasonably be foreseen would be affected by the conspiracy."
Id. at 220. 6) The "zone of interest" approach. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 221
F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975). This standing test requires that the plaintiff have been
injured in fact and that he be within the zone of interest to be protected by the statute
in question. For a circuit by circuit discussion of these approaches, see Note, Standing to
Sue in Private Antitrust Litigation: Circuits in Conflict, 10 IND. L. REV. 532 (1977).
" See text at notes 19-31 supra.
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sive use of the "pass-on theory." The Court first enunciated the concept of
antitrust injury in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, inc. 67 Plaintiffs were
individual bowling centers which alleged that Brunswick, one . of the two
largest manufacturers of bowling equipment in the United States, had violated
the antimerger provisions contained in section 7 of the Clayton Act 68
 by ac-
quiring numerous bowling centers. 69 During a period of rapid expansion in
the howling industry Brunswick sold lanes, pinschers and ancillary equipment
to individual bowling centers on a secured credit basis. 7" When the bowling
industry went ito a sharp decline during the 1960's, Brunswick acquired 222
centers which had defaulted, 168 of which it continued to operate." The
plaintiffs claimed that if Brunswick had not entered their respective markets,
these failing centers would have gone out of business through the forces of
natural competition, thereby increasing plaintiffs' profits."
A unanimous Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs were not enti-
tled to damages." The Court held:
[F]or plaintiffs to recover treble damages on account of § 7 viola-
tions, they must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal
presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which
is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to pre-
vent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlaw-
ful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the
violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It
should, in short, be "the type of loss that the claimed violations ...
would be likely to cause.""
The antitrust laws were enacted, the Court noted, for " 'the protection of
competition, not competitors.' " 75 Hence, plaintiffs who complain about the
effects of continued exposure to competition fall outside the protection of the
antitrust laws.
In addition to requiring proof of antitrust injury, the Supreme Court has
dramatically limited the scope of section 4 protection in cases involving a
chain of distribution by prohibiting the use of the "pass-on theory." The
pass-on theory is that a middleman, forced to pay an artificially high price
because of an antitrust violation committed by his supplier, will attempt to
pass-on the illegal overcharge to his customers. Depending upon the elasticity
67 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
66 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Section 7 prohibits certain acquisitions of a corpora-
tion by another, whether through purchase of stock or assets, the effect of which "may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Id.
69 429 U.S. at 479-80.
70 Id. at 479.
71 Id. at 480.
72 Id. at 481.
73 Id. at 490.
74 Id. at 489.
75 Id. at 488 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320
(1962)).
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of the demand for the product," the middleman will be able to pass-on any-
where from part to all of the overcharge. This process of passing-on can con-
tinue down the chain of distribution to the ultimate consumer.
Using the pass-on theory defensively, an antitrust defendant faced with a
suit by a direct purchaser could claim that the purchaser was not in fact in-
jured by the full amount of the overcharge because he was able to pass-on the
higher price to his own customers. The Supreme Court considered the use of
this defense in Hanover Shoe, Inc., v. United Shoe Machinery Corp." Plaintiff
was a shoe manufacturer and the defendant was a manufacturer of shoe
machinery." The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had monopolized the
shoe machinery industry in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act" by its
practice of leasing and refusing to sell its shoe machinery. 8 " The defendant
denied that the plaintiff had suffered any injury because it had been able to
pass-on the extra cost of leasing the machinery to its own customers. 8 ' The
Supreme Court held that the defendant was not permitted to use this pass-on
defense."
The Court reasoned that the use of the defense would require "massive
evidence and complicated theories" in order to determine the amount of the
overcharge that was passed-on." Because of the wide range of factors affect-
ing a firm's pricing policies, the Court concluded that this task would nor-
mally prove to be "insurmountable". 84 Furthermore, the Court reasoned, if
the pass-on defense were allowed it could be used against any member of the
distribution chain except the ultimate consumer. 85 Because the ultimate con-
sumers would have such a small interest in attempting a class action, there
would be no one willing to bring a suit against an antitrust violator and the
effectiveness of treble damage actions would he greatly reduced. 8" Thus by
allowing a plaintiff to collect three times the full amount of an overcharge,
the Court both avoided what it concluded would be a fruitless economic
analysis and encouraged the enforcement of the antitrust laws through treble
damage actions.
7" If the demand for a product is relatively "inelastic" it is not greatly affected
by an increase or decrease in price. Thus if middlemen raise their prices in response
to a price increase by the manufacturer, the sales of the product will not be substan-
tially reduced. See P. SAMUELSON, EcoNoMics 381-386 (1976); I.. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST
787 (1977).
" 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
7 " Id. at 483.
7" 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
8" 392 U.S. at 483.
81 Id. at 487-88.
82 Id. at 494. The one exception to the Court's holding was "when an over-
charged buyer has a pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract, thus making it easy to prove that.
he has not been damaged--where the considerations requiring that the passing-on
defense not be permitted in this case would not he present." Id.
83 Id. at 493.
84
 Id.
at 494.
88 Id.
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An indirect purchaser from an antitrust defendant, one who has pur-
chased the defendant's product through one or more middlemen, would use the
pass-one theory offensively to prove that he was injured when the illegal over-
charge was passed-on to him. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois' the Supreme
Court was required to decide whether this offensive use of the pass-on theory
was consistent with its earlier holding in Hanover Shoe." The State of Illinois
had purchased buildings which incorporated bricks manufacturered by the
defendant.• Although the state was two levels of distribution removed from
the defendant, it claimed that the overcharge on the bricks, created by the
defendant's price fixing conspiracy, was passed-on to the state by the general
and masonry contractors."
The Court. first decided that whatever rule was ultimately adopted re-
garding the use of the pass-on theory, it must apply equally to plaintiffs and
defendants. • ' To allow the offensive but not the defensive use of the theory,
the Court observed, would involve a serious risk of multiple liability." 2 Not
only would the direct purchaser be able to collect three times the overcharge,
but each of the indirect purchasers would he able to collect three times the
amount passed on. 93 The Court concluded, therefore, that it had the option
of either overruling Hanover Shoe or banning the offensive use of the pass-on
theory.94 The Court decided to uphold the Hanover Shoe rule and held that
the pass-on theory cannot be used by either plaintiffs or defendants."
In support of its holding the Court repeated the logic of Hanover Shoe. If
offensive use of the pass-on theory were permitted, the same insurmountable
task of determining the amount of overcharge passed-on at each level of dis-
tribution would result. 9" Furthermore, in virtually every private antitrust ac-
tion all indirect purchasers would have to be joined as "persons needed for a
just adjudication." 17 The courts would be required to apportion any damage
award among all these interested parties."" The Court concluded that "[w]e
are no more inclined than we were in Hanover Shoe to ignore the burdens that
such an attempt would impose on the effective enforcement of the antitrust
laws."'"
87 420 U.S. 720 (1977).
88 Id. at 728.
8" Id. at 726.'
9" Id. at 727.
"' Id. at 728.
"2
 Id. at 730.
93 Id .
"4 Id. at 729.
Id. at 735, 745-46. The Court carved out the same "cost-plus" exception as
that in Hanover Shoe for plaintiffs who can demonstrate a pre-existing, fixed quantity,
cost-plus contract at each level up to the antitrust violator. Id. at 735-36, 745. See Note,
Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall: The Future of Indirect Purchasers in Antitrust Litigation, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 309 (1978).
9 ' 420 U.S. at 741-43.
97 Id. at 738.
"8 Id. at 740-41.
"" Id. at 741.
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.	 In addition to this added complexity, the Court noted, offensive use of
the pass-on theory would so dilute any recovery that potential plaintiffs would
lack the incentive to sue.'" The Court concluded that the intent of Congress
to create a group of private attorneys general to enforce the antitrust laws is
better served by concentrating the entire recovery in the direct purchasers,
and thus giving them incentive to sue, than by attempting to apportion the
overcharge throughout the chain of distribution. 1 °' The Court recognized
that its holding would deny recovery to those indirect purchasers who are in
fact injured by antitrust violations and that section 4 was. designed in part as a
remedy for such injuries.'" The offensive use of the pass-on theory was
nevertheless disallowed, because in addition to its desire to insure the effective
enforcement of the antitrust laws, the Court questioned whether the attempt.
to allocate damages throughout the chain of distribution actually would serve
as an effective remedy or would simply deplete the overall recovery in litigat-
ing the pass-on issue.' 03
One consequence of the Supreme Court's holdings in Brunswick and Il-
linois Brick is that two major restrictions on the scope of section 4 now exist in
addition to the antitrust standing tests developed in the circuits. Although the
Supreme Court correctly stated in Illinois Brick that "the question of which
persons have been injured by an illegal overcharge for purposes of § 4 is
analytically distinct from the question of which persons have sustained injuries
too remote to give them standing to sue for damages under § 4," 134
 the result
is the same. A plaintiff who is unable to meet the requirements of the appli-
cable standing test, or who is determined not to have alleged antitrust injury,
or who is an indirect purchaser, will be unable to take his treble damage
action to trial. The problem which the federal courts face today is how to
integrate these three major restrictions on the scope of section 4, each of
which has a different purpose and focus, into a coherent analysis of a plain-
tiff's section 4 action at the pre-trial stage. It was precisely this problem which
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit faced in Mid-West Paper Products
Co. v. Continental Group." 5
H. MID-WEST PAPER Co. v. CONTINENTAL GROUP
A. The Majority's Rationale
In Mid-West, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered tra-
ditional antitrust standing tests, the Supreme Court's requirement of antitrust
injury in Brunswick, and the Supreme Court's holding in Illinois Brick in decid-
ing whether Murray's of Baederwood had standing to sue as the purchaser
from a competitor of the antitrust defendants.'" At the beginning of its
analysis, the court noted that no specific test of antitrust standing is control-
"" Id. at 745,
111
 Id. at 746.
•L Id.
143 Id. at 746-47.
104
 Id. at 728 ri.7.
"5
 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
1 ""' Id. at 582.
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ling in the Third Circuit.'" Instead, the court stated that it would utilize a
"functional analysis of the- factual context presented in each case 'so as to
preserve the effectiveness of the treble damage remedy without overextending
its availability.' 108 The court noted that this approach was first enunciated
in Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp.'" where the "directness"
of the injury and the "plaintiff's position in the area of the economy"
threatened by the illegal acts—touchstones of the direct injury and target area
tests—were deemed important standing considerations."°
The Mid-West court indicated that in making standing determinations it
would also consider the Supreme Court's definition of antitrust injury and the
Court's holding in Illinois Brick. 1 " The Third Circuit acknowledged that an-
titrust standing, the definition of antitrust injury and the ban on the use of
the pass-on theory were "analytically distinct," but observed that they were
related in that they all involve enforcement of the antitrust laws: "Together,
they constitute the judicial gloss upon the words of § 4 by which the courts
have patrolled the portals to a treble damage action."" 2 Finally, the court
stated that it would consider the danger of duplicative or ruinous recovery,
the complexity of proof that the plaintiff's claim would entail, and what result
best served the purposes of the antitrust laws.'" The dual purposes of the
section 4 treble damage action, the court stated, are to provide a remedy to
injured parties and to deter violators, while the overriding goal of the anti-
trust laws is to preserve free competition. 14
In applying its "functional analysis" approach to Murray's claim, the
court assumed arguendo that Murray's was injured by the price fixing conspi-
racy. 15 In addition, the court acknowledged that Murray's, as a purchaser of
consumer bags, may have been within that area of the economy threatened by
the illegal activity." 6 Thus in the court's view Murray's met the constitutional
test for standing—injury in fact—and the target area test. Other factors,
however, convinced the court that Murray's was not among those '— whose
protection is the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws.' " 17
First, the court noted that Murray's was not in a "direct or immediate
relationship to the antitrust violators." "H It was Murray's supplier, and not
the defendants, who was enriched by any overcharge that Murray's may have
'° 7 Id.
108 Id. (quoting Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp., 543
F.2d 501, 508 (3d Cir. 1976)).
109 543 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1976).
10 596 F.2d at 582 (quoting Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials and Equipment
Corp., 543 F.2d at 508).
'" 596 F.2d at 582.
112 Id.
"3
 Id. at 583.
"4 Id.
"5 Id.
its Id.
17 Id. (quoting In re 141ultidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973)).
18 596 F.2d at 583.
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paid." 9
 Furthermore, the court reasoned, the result of any attempt to meas-
ure the level of prices had there not been a conspiracy would be "highly con-
jectural" because of the multitude of factors involved in pricing decisions.'"
Thus it would be unlikely that Murray's could demonstrate that a lower price
would have prevailed in the market absent the conspiracy and hence prove
actual damage.' 21 The Mid-West court observed that the competitors might
have charged the same price complained of regardless of the conspiracy.'"
Not only would it be difficult for Murray's to prove the amount of its
damages, the court continued, but any attempt to do so would transform the
trial into a complex economic proceeding of the sort that Illinois Brick sought
to prevent.'" Moreover, an expansion of standing to include Murray's would
not result in an increased antitrust enforcement in view of the complexity
involved in determining injury. 12 4 The Mid-West court asserted that Illinois
Brick stood for the proposition that once the recovery from price fixers is
concentrated in the hands of the direct purchasers, the effective and vigorous
enforcement of the antitrust law is assured. 125 Because Illinois Brick "singled
out" direct purchasers as the group whose protection is the fundamental pur-
pose of the antitrust laws, the Mid-West court concluded, there was no reason
to "expand" the standing doctrine to include a purchaser from a competitor
of the defendants.'"
A final reason for not expanding the standing doctrine to include Mur-
ray's, the court added, is that to allow recovery when there is such tenuous
causality between the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's injury could sub-
ject antitrust violators to potentially ruinous liablity.' 27
 If Murray's were al-
lowed to maintain its action, the defendants could be held liable for higher
1 ID 1d .
121 Id. at 584. The Mid-West court., quoting Justice White's opinion in Hanover
Shoe, noted " la] wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies. Nor-
mally the impact of a single change in the relevant conditions cannot be measured
after the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to slate whether, had one fact
been different , he would have chosen a different price.' Id. See Hanover Shoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. at 492-93. Those factors involved in a
company's pricing policy, observed the Mid-West court, include a company's production
efficiency, its expenses, its marketing strategy, and the elasticity of demand for its
product. 596 F.2d at 584. The Mid-West court determined that, to some degree, a
company's pricing decisions are unaffected'hy the prices charged by others; "the com-
petitors of the price fixers may well have charged the sante price notwithstanding the
conspiracy, and purchasers such as Murray would be hard pressed to prove other-
wise." Id.
121 hi.
122 Id. The court acknowledged, however, that in an oligopolistic market an
umbrella can be created under which a competitor can raise its prices without fear of a
decrease in the demand for its product. Id. at 584 n.45. On oligopolistic market struc-
tures, see generally L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRus -r, §§ 115-117 (1977).
122
 596 F.2(1 at 585.
124 Id.
125 Id.
1211 Id
127 Id. at 586.
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prices in the entire industry.'" The goal of the antitrust laws, to maintain a
competitive economy, would be frustrated by allowing huge recoveries that
could "cripple" a defendant and might lead to a decrease in competition.'"
The court concluded that these countervailing factors of ruinous, duplicative,
or speculative damages, and the desire to avoid unduly complex litigation
"were emphasized by the Surpeme Court—though in a slightly different
context—in Illinois Brick, and we are not free to ignore the thrust of its deci-
sion."' 3" Whereas the majority found Illinois Brick to militate against Mur-
ray's standing to sue, Judge Higginbotham in his dissent came to the opposite
conclusion.
B. The Dissent
Judge Higginbotham, dissenting only from the denial of standing to
Murray's, agreed that the balancing approach used by the majority was the
best method of analysis.' 3 ' He decided, however, that the "goals of just com-
pensation, vigorous enforcement and free competition" would be served best
by granting standing to Murray's and, as such, outweighed the countervailing
factors mentioned by the majority.' 32 The dissenting judge indicated that
Murray's injuries would go uncompensated if standing were denied and that
these damages would not be duplicative of any other recovery.' 33 An action
by Mtirray's would encourage increased private enforcement and hence deter
violations of the antitrust laws.' 34 Murray's action would not have the unde-
sirable effect of diluting the recovery of other plaintiffs and thereby lessening
their incentive to sue.' 35 Whereas the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick expressed
the fear that direct purchasers might be unwilling to sue their suppliers,
the purchaser from a competitor of a price-fixing defendant would not have
this unwillingness to sue.' 3" Granting standing to plaintiffs such as Murray's,
the judge concluded, would be one way to avoid the risk of non-enforcement
created when direct purchasers were deemed the only parties injured within
the chain of distribution.' 37
Applying one element of the target test area, Judge Higginbotham con-
sidered the foreseeability of Murray's injury.' 3 " The judge stated, lilt is
128 Id.
139
 Id. at 586-87.
I" Id. at 587.
131 Id. at 595. Judge Higginbotham also dissented from the application of the
holding as regarded Murray's to Mid-West Paper Products Co. in its capacity as a
purchaser from a competitor of the defendant. Id. He joined with the majority in its
other holdings. Id.
132 Id.
/33 Id.
134 Id. at 596.
135 Id.
136 Id. The Supreme Court expressed this fear in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. at 746.
137 596 F.2d at 596.
133 Id. at 596-97.
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foreseeable if not inevitable that, when those with a substantial share of the
market fix prices, their competitors will also raise prices under the anti-
competitive umbrella established by price-fixers." 139 Because of this
foreseeability, the judge concluded that Murray's injury was proximately
caused by the defendant and was within the target area of the violation, both
factors, in his view, being relevant to standing determinations in the Third
Circuit.' 40 He went on to evaluate the seriousness of this violation and stated
that because price fixing is "probably the clearest violation of the antitrust
laws and the one most obnoxious to the underlying policy of free competition
," broad liability should be imposed on price fixers."'
In considering the factors which weighed against granting standing, the
judge stressed that the damages claimed by Murray's were not .duplicative,
derivative, or a "windfall," traditional reasons for denying standing.' 42 The
judge acknowledged the importance of the majority's concern that the dam-
ages collected by plaintiffs such as Murray's might be ruinous to price fixing
defendants."' He asserted, however, that the ruinous nature of damages
should not be a factor "unless there is a very persuasive basis from which to
conclude that competition would actually be hurt by the allowance of stand-
ing."'" Judge Higginbotham did not find such a persuasive basis in the
action brought by Murray's. 145 Moreover, the judge did not find the com-
plexity of proving damages, or the speculativeness of the amount of the dam-
ages, to be convincing factors.'" He doubted whether the proof of damages
by Murray's would in fact be significantly more complex or speculative than in
suits brought by direct purchasers."' He also noted that the complexity of
proof was important in Illinois Brick because in suits brought by indirect pur-
chasers such complexity could undermine the enforcement of the antitrust
laws; 148 Murray's proof of damages, in contrast, would encourage effective
enforcement of those laws.'" The concern about added complexity, the
judge concluded, was therefore greatly diminished.'"
The Mid- West decision merits careful consideration because the approach
taken by the Third Circuit in this case represents a bold attempt to bring
"analytically distinct" concerns within one analytical framework. The court at-
tempted to integrate the critical concerns both of the lower federal courts in
creating antitrust standing tests and of the Supreme Court in its Brunswick
139
 Id. at 597.
140 Id .
141 Id.
142 Id. at 597-98.
143 Id. at 598.
144 Id. The dissenting judge reasoned that because only companies with a sub-
stantial share of the market could significantly affect the prices charged by com-
petitors, large recoveries would only be levied against large companies or a large col-
lection of smaller companies. Id.
145 Id.
' 46 Id. at 598-99.
" 7 Id. at 599.
148 Id.
149 Id.
' 5 ° Id.
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and Illinois Brick decisions."' Judge Higginbotham, however, raised the in-
triguing question of whether the majority was sufficiently attuned to the pol-
icy considerations of the precedents which it found to be controlling.
III. EVALUATION
. A. The Functional Analysis
The Third Circuit's "functional analysis" is a good approach for deter-
mining antitrust standing because it allows a court to consider, distinguish,
and balance three limitations on section 4 which could terminate a plaintiff's
case at the pre-trial stage. Traditional antitrust standing tests, Brunswick, and
Illinois Brick are best considered together because each limitation, although
"analytically distinct," has the basic goal of encouraging competition. The dis-
tinction between these limitations lies in their respective rationales. Antitrust
standing tests such as the direct injury test and target area test are primarily
intended to prevent exposing defendants to such ruinous liability that they
would be driven out of business altogether and competition thereby re-
duced.' 52 In contrast, the requirement of proving antitrust injury established
in Brunswick insures that a company which is acting in a pro-competitive man-
ner not be held liable for the effects of its actions.'" Finally, the Illinois Brick
holding attempts to insure that the antitrust laws will be vigorously enforced
and competition thereby maintained.'" Thus Brunswick is concerned with
the type of injury sustained, the traditional antitrust standing tests with the
possibility of too much enforcement, and the Illinois Brick holding with the
possibility of too little enforcement.
There is an apparent incongruity in the fact that one limitation placed on
section 4 attempts to limit enforcement of the antitrust laws while another
attempts to increase enforcement. When utilized properly, however, both limi-
tations serve the goal of maintaining competition. The direct injury and target
area tests were developed initially in cases where a competitor of the defen-
dant sustained injury. 155 In such cases the competitor is the logical party to
sue and has sufficient incentive to bring a section 4 action. If additional indi-
viduals with injuries derived from the competitor's injuries are allowed to sue,
their recovery would not decrease the recovery of the competitor, but would
increase the defendant's exposure. The lower federal courts have attempted
to limit the number of these suits by labeling the injuries "indirect," lest the
antitrust laws be enforced. so vigorously that defendants are driven out of
business.
In price fixing cases, however, where prices have been artificially raised,
the situation is different. Here the direct purchaser, absent defensive use of
151 Id. at 583.
152 See text at notes 19-22 supra.
"3 See text at notes 67 -75 supra.
154 See text at notes 76-103 supra.
155 See Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952); Loeb v. Eastnian Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d
Cir. 1910).
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the pass-on theory, is both the logical party to sue and has sufficient incentive
to bring a section 4 action. In Illinois Brick the Supreme Court determined
that if indirect purchasers are allowed to sue using the pass-on theory offen-
sively, defensive use of the theory must be allowed and the recovery of the
direct purchaser would thereby be reduced.' 56 The process of trying to allo-
cate damages through the chain of distribution would result in such complex
litigation and the possibility of such a small recovery by an individual plaintiff
that no one would have the incentive to sue.'" Thus, with price fixing viola-
tions, the possibility of too many section 4 actions would result in too little en-
forcement of the antitrust laws with a resulting decrease in competition.
Although the Illinois Brick holding is superficially an application of the direct
injury test in that indirectly injured individuals are not allowed to sue, its
rationale of encouraging the enforcement of the antitrust laws is the opposite
of the rationale of the direct injury or other traditional tests of antitrust stand-
ing which tend to reduce the enforcement of certain violations. Because of
these differing rationales, Illinois Brick should not be considered authority for
denying standing to all plaintiffs who do not fall into the "directly injured"
category.' 5 8
The particular advantage of the Third Circuit's functional analysis ap-
proach is that it allows a court to break away from the arbitrary categories
imposed by traditional antitrust standing tests and decide on a case by case
basis what result best serves the goal of encouraging competition. The prob-
lem with the Mid-West decision is that the court failed to adequately distin-
guish those factors which it identified as important in the determination of
standing or consider the policy behind each of those factors. The court placed
an undue emphasis on the indirectness of Murray's injury; it did not inquire
into the existence of antitrust injury; and it. misread both the holding and
rationale of Illinois Brick.
B. Functional Analysis Applied
The Mid-West court, in evaluating Murray's position in the area of the
economy affected by the defendants' conspiracy and the directness of the al-
leged injuries, gave Murray's a passing mark on the target area test and a
failing mark on the direct injury test.' 5" The court emphasized that although
Murray's had suffered injuries and may have been in the affected area of the
economy, these injuries were indirect.'" The defendant did not profit from
any injury to Murray's and allowing Murray's to sue might expose the defen-
dant to ruinous liability.'" Several problems arise from this analysis and
from the majority's conclusion that countervailing factors outweighed the fact
that Murray's was within the target area of the violation.
I " 431 U.S. 720, 736-41.
' 57 Id. at 745.
158 But see Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394, 397 (10th Cir. 1979).
'5'1
	 F.2d at 583.
160 Id.
Id. at 583, 586.
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Under the functional analysis approach, the court should not have de-
nied standing on the basis of indirect injury without explaining why an action
by Murray's would frustrate any of the purposes of section 4 or of the anti-
trust laws. Judge Higginbotham pointed out in his dissent, Murray's injuries
were neither duplicative nor derivative, traditional reasons for denying stand-
ing. Aside from general speculation, the Mid-West court did not demonstrate
that permitting Murray's suit would result in ruinous liability and thus de-
crease competition. Both Congress and the Supreme Court have emphasized
that section 4 is primarily a remedial statute." 2 Unless demonstrable reasons
exist for denying standing, such as duplicative injuries or a real danger of a
marked decrease in competition, an injured party should be entitled to this
section 4 remedy. Thus the Mid-West court, in analyzing the effect of tradi-
tional antitrust standing concerns on Murray's claim, did little more than for-
malistically apply the direct injury test.
Although the Mid-West court identified the presence or absence of anti-
trust injury to be an important element of its functional analysis approach,
nowhere in the Mid-West decision did the court discuss whether Murray's had
in fact. suffered antitrust injury. Instead, the court seemed to equate tradi-
tional antitrust standing with antitrust injury. The court quoted on several
occasions an observation from a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, In re
Multidislrict Vehicle Air Pollution,'" that the antitrust standing doctrine had
been forged to confine the availability of treble damages "to those individuals
whose protection is the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws. ',164 The
Mid-West court did not note, however, that satisfying the criteria of an anti-
trust standing test does not guarantee that a plaintiff has alleged sufficient
antitrust injury, as defined in Brunswick, and that for this reason a separate
inquiry into antitrust injury must be made.
In Brunswick, for example, the plaintiffs were direct competitors with the
defendant and thus met the standards of both the direct injury and target
area tests. A distinct inquiry by the Supreme Court into the nature of the
defendant's alleged antitrust violation, however, revealed that the plaintiffs
were injured only by increased competition and therefore had not sustained
antitrust injury. A careful inquiry would have revealed that Murray's had sus-
tained antitrust injury. As the district court in State of Washington v. American
Pipe and Construction Co. 165. pointed, out, the purpose of a price fixing conspi-
racy is to end competitive bidding in an entire industry." 6 Murray's injury, if
proved, certainly flowed from the anticompetitive aspects of the defendants'
actions and hence Murray sufficiently alleged "antitrust injury ... injury
162 The discussion on the floor of the House of Representatives in connection
with the passage of the Clayton Act reveals that private treble damage actions were
conceived primarily as "open[ing] the door of justice to every man, whenever he may
be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws, and giv[ing] the injured party ample
damages for the wrong suffered." 51 CoNc. REC. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb).
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977).
"3 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
"4 596 F.2d at 581, 582, 583, 585, 587.
"5 280 F. Stipp. 802,(W.D. Wash. 1968).
'68 Id. at 807.
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which the antitrust laws were intended to prevent."'" Although the inquiry
into antitrust injury would not have been dispositive in Mid-West, as other
tests remained to be satisfied, the court should have addressed this issue ini-
tially because in the absence of antitrust injury any further inquiry becomes
unnecessary.
The third important factor identified by the Mid-West court was the Sup-
reme Court's holding in Illinois Brick regarding the use of the pass-on theory.
The Mid-West court noted that although Illinois Brick was not directly control-
ling, the decision was very important in its standing analysis. The Mid-West
court misunderstood the rationale of Illinois Brick, however, when it stated
that "Illinois Brick represents in effect the proposition that when defendants
have fixed prices above the competitive market price ... the objectives of the
treble damage action are fulfilled when the defendants are required to pay
the direct purchasers three times the overcharge."'" The Supreme Court
slid not suggest in Illinois Brick that the objectives of section 4 would be fulfil-
led by its holding, or that direct purchasers were to be the exclusive be-
neficiaries of section 4 actions in price-fixing cases. Rather, the Court made
the pragmatic decision that the antitrust laws would be more effectively en-
forced if direct purchasers, to the exclusion of indirect purchasers in the
chain of distribution, were allowed to collect three times the full amount of
the overcharge."" As Judge Higginbotham pointed out, the primary concern
of Illinois Brick was not limiting the impact of section 4, but increasing its im-
pact and thus encouraging the effective enforcement of the antitrust. laws.'"
The Mid-West court emphasized that Murray's proof of damages would
be highly conjectural. The court stated that, as it understood the Illinois Brick
holding, it was "imperative - that the Mid-West action not be transformed into
a complex economic proceeding." ' Unlike the situation in Illinois Brick, how-
ever, Murray's action would not have required the joinder of other parties
and thus would not have hampered private enforcement of the antitrust laws.
In fact, as Judge Higgenbotham indicated, independent suits by plaintiffs
such as Murray's would lead to increased enforcement of the antitrust laws,
especially when the direct purchaser from a price-fixing conspirator is unwill-
ing to sue and endanger the source of his supply.'" In light of the concern
expressed in Illinois Brick for encouraging private antitrust enforcement, it.
seems clear that the "thrust" of that decision did not at all preclude suits by
plaintiffs such as Murray's.
CONCLUSION
After Brunswick and Illinois Brick have been examined in relation to Mur-
ray's claim, it is apparent that those decisions, rather than militating against
Murray's standing to sue, suggest that Murray's suit should have gone to trial.
" 7 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
1 " 8 596 F.2d at. 585.
"9 431 U.S. at 745-46.
10 596 F.2d at 596.
I" Id. at 585.
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The only real barricade to Murray's standing was that he was in an indirect
relation to the antitrust defendants. The Mid-West decision suggests that the
jurisdiction which initially developed the direct injury test in Loeb v. Eastman
Kodak Co.'" is not entirely ready to abandon the relatively easy answers which
that test provides.' 74 The Third Circuit's "functional analysis" approach to
antitrust standing does hold great promise, however, if courts which apply it
are careful to inquire into the policy considerations which inform traditional
antitrust standing tests, the Brunswick requirement of antitrust injury, and the
holding in Illinois Brick.
ADELBERT L. SPITZER
I" 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
"4 The court was also seriously hampered by its apparently incomplete know-
ledge of the facts surrounding Murray's suit. Murray's entire claim as the purchaser
from a competitor of the defendants arose because one of Murray's officers suggested
in a deposition that one of the companies from which Murray's purchased bags "is a
paper supplier and it's possible they manufacture. I don't know." 596 F.2d at 576.
Although more information would not be necessary for an application of the direct
injury test, a "functional analysis of the factual context presented in each case" does
require more information concerning the plaintiff's claim and the relevant market.
The Mid-West court would have been well advised to outline its functional analysis
approach and then remand the case so that Murray's could file affidavits stating his
supplier's name, whether or not the supplier was in fact a bag manufacturer, what its
share of the market was, whether it could offer any explanation of its pricing policies,
and the amount of Murray's purchases. If there was no material dispute as to these
facts the lower court would have been able to make an informed functional analysis of
Murray's claim.
